Sure, nothing matters objectively, in the sense of on a cosmic, eternal scale. But, it's still a shame to devote so much of one's time to preaching a gospel whose falsity remains unknown to the earnest, sincere preacher.
There is no good reason to believe categorical, universally binding ought to or ought not to statements exist.
There is no good reason to believe that human abortion is something that has a moral character, either good or bad.
There is no good reason to believe human beings -- fetal or full grown -- have intrinsic value.
There is no good reason to believe human beings -- fetal or full grown -- have naturally existing (non-governmental) rights.
There is no good reason to believe that any ostensibly factual statement of what's "moral" or "immoral" is anything but absurd.
Why is it a shame? B/c you say so? I don't even know you exist.
It's not true that I ought to listen to you or care about what you say. It's also not true that I ought NOT to listen to you or care about what you say. And it doesn't matter whether those things are true or not true. And it doesn't matter whether that last statement is true.
What's sad is that you can't see how you're selling pure, absurd despair. It's not enough that you imbibe it. You want others to share in your absurdity and despair. It's an indication that you're made in the image of God. It's part of the suppression of the truth in unrighteousness in which you engage.
Why is it a shame? B/c you say so? I don't even know you exist.
You’re preaching Moral Teaching [X], which is predicated on the veracity of Worldview [A]. In actuality, though, Worldview [A] is not veracious, whereas no flaws have been found in Worldview [B]. On Worldview [B], Moral Teaching [X] is neither true nor false; it’s absurd. Inasmuch as you are earnestly and sincerely preaching something that is absurd but whose absurdity you don’t realize—and that you would not preach if you did realize its absurdity—it’s a shame.
Your subsequent comments were alternate phrasings of things I already wrote:
It's not true that I ought to listen to you or care about what you say. It's also not true that I ought NOT to listen to you or care about what you say.
I already wrote: There is no good reason to believe categorical, universally binding ought to or ought not to statements exist.
And it doesn't matter whether those things are true or not true. And it doesn't matter whether that last statement is true.
I already wrote: Sure, nothing matters objectively, in the sense of on a cosmic, eternal scale.
What's sad is that you can't see how you're selling pure, absurd despair.
That a worldview is despairing has nothing to do with the worldview’s veracity.
It's not enough that you imbibe it. You want others to share in your absurdity and despair.
Maybe I do and maybe I don’t. My worldview certainly can accommodate my arbitrary individual whims, even if they have no force of compulsion on me or anyone else.
It's an indication that you're made in the image of God. It's part of the suppression of the truth in unrighteousness in which you engage.
The only "ought to" and "ought not to" statements that are sustainable are those wrapped in conditionals.
For example, "If one wishes to believe things that are truthful, then one ought to believe things that there is good reason to believe." The force of that "ought to," though, is entirely dependent upon the conditional being the case. If the conditional is not the case, then the "ought to" is emptied of power.
For another example, "If one wishes not to cause grievous, torturous harm to children, then one ought not to brutally abuse five-year-old children." The force of that "ought not to" is entirely dependent upon the conditional being the case. If the conditional is not the case, then the "ought not to" is emptied of power.
Do most atheists refuse to accept the implications of moral and existential nihilism?
Why use words like "grievous"? The only source of meaning for that word is your own opinions. Like so: "If one wishes not to cause something to children that Mr. Dan considers on the basis of his own entirely unsupported and unsubstantiable opinion to be grievous, torturous harm to children, then one ought not to brutally abuse five-year-old children."
1) You weren't using it in a morally neutral sense. 2) You don't even know for sure that those other beings exist, so you can't know whether they are suffering. 3) You also don't know that suffering has any meaning beyond chemical reactions in the brain.
1) You weren't using it in a morally neutral sense.
Yes, I was. “Causing grievous, torturous harm to children” is constructed identically to “Baking hot, crunchy doughnuts for customers.” One can identify grievous, torturous harm without expressing disapprobation toward it.
2) You don't even know for sure that those other beings exist, so you can't know whether they are suffering.
Whether those other beings exist is an is question. My worldview is more than capable of tackling is questions. Whether they are suffering is also an is question.
3) You also don't know that suffering has any meaning beyond chemical reactions in the brain.
The only “meaning,” in the sense you use the word, that I can sustain is personal, subjective meaning, which is little more than the experienced product of brain activity.
So what? It's not true that such a thing is bad, as we've already agreed.
Yes, we agree: On my worldview, absolutely nothing has an objective moral character, either virtuous or wicked. All questions of objective, factual morality are absurd, and there are no categorical, universally binding oughts or ought nots.
What I was trying to do was explain how non-categorical, non-universally binding statements of ought and ought not can be achieved on my worldview. They can be achieved by wrapping all such statements in conditionals. Conditional ought and ought not statements are fully consonant with moral and existential nihilism.
Here's a conditional: If Joe wants to achieve a state of sexual pleasure, then he ought to rape six 7 year olds. And it just so happens that Joe thinks doing so is morally obligatory.
On your worldview, his moral viewpoint has as much validity as yours: zero.
Here's a conditional: If Joe wants to achieve a state of sexual pleasure, then he ought to rape six 7 year olds. And it just so happens that Joe thinks doing so is morally obligatory.
On your worldview, his moral viewpoint has as much validity as yours: zero.
There's a whole bunch of different things being wrapped together there.
Your "If Joe wants to achieve" statement was indeed a conditional, and through that conditional an ought statement was achievable even on moral and existential nihilism (albeit not a categorical, universally binding one). But, when you added, "And it just so happens that Joe thinks doing so is morally obligatory, that crossed into new terrain. On moral and existential nihilism, Joe thinking that anything is morally obligatory (or morally forbidden) is irredeemably absurd.
So, when you say, On your worldview, his moral viewpoint has as much validity as yours: zero, that's not quite true. His conditional ought statement has as much validity as any other conditional ought statement, from me or anyone else. But his absurd belief in a moral obligation is just that: absurd. And, unless I express an absurd belief in a moral obligation, it's not quite correct to say Joe and I stand on equal footing, as regards validity of beliefs.
But his absurd belief in a moral obligation is just that: absurd
Is there something wrong with absurdity? Surely you wouldn't assert one is obligated to avoid absurdity, would you? So, what's the problem here? Saying non-absurd things has as much value as saying absurd things - zero.
Surely you wouldn't assert one is obligated to avoid absurdity, would you?
No.
So, what's the problem here? Saying non-absurd things has as much value as saying absurd things - zero.
Misses the point. In the sense in which you're using the word "value," a rancid steak has as much "value" as the finest steak in the country. That doesn't mean they are the same, or interchangeable in all contexts.
To interchange unlike things as though they were like things is to be irrational. It's irrational to hold unlike things as like things.
Is there a categorical, universally binding compulsion to be rational? No. But if one does declare one's adherence to rationality, then, within that declared adherence, one ought to be rational. That, thereby, forbids treating unlike things as like things.
P1. If one wishes to be rational, one ought not to do irrational things. P2. It's irrational to hold unlike things as like things. C. If one wishes to be rational, one ought not to hold unlike things as like things.
So what if I were mistaken? No obligation to believe truth exists, remember?
I never said an obligation to believe truth exists. Where do you feel that I implied one?
I'm perfectly satisfied to say your understanding of the principle of non-contradiction is mistaken (at least as conveyed through your initial ad hoc objection).
I was just reminding you that no such obligation exists, b/c it seemed like you were implying such. Here's what I mean. You said: Then you would be mistaken.
Why didn't you respond this way? Then ice cream tastes like Tuesday.
The latter would carry just as much value and meaning as the former - none.
I was just reminding you that no such obligation exists, b/c it seemed like you were implying such.
None does, and I was not.
Here's what I mean. You said: Then you would be mistaken.
Why didn't you respond this way? Then ice cream tastes like Tuesday.
The latter would carry just as much value and meaning as the former - none.
You are mistaken. It is a perfectly coherent, intelligible, apprehensible utterance to say that one’s assertion is not consonant with truth. By contrast, “Then ice cream tastes like Tuesday,” is not coherent, intelligible or apprehensible.
The intelligibility of an utterance like, “Then you would be mistaken,” is not predicated upon an obligation not to be mistaken.
You *think* you apprehended it. What you actually apprehended was your brain's interpretation of the sensations communicated to it by the nerves that brought the sensations your eyes communicated through them.
How do you know there wasn't a screw-up along the way?
You *think* you apprehended it. What you actually apprehended was your brain's interpretation of the sensations communicated to it by the nerves that brought the sensations your eyes communicated through them.
You’re mixing up your words, methinks. You didn’t describe what I apprehended but, rather, how I apprehended. What I apprehended was this: “Then you would be mistaken.”
How do you know there wasn't a screw-up along the way?
There is no evidence my cognition is generally faulty. There is evidence my cognition is generally reliable.
How do you know those things are required?
I don’t. However, all known cognition requires a physical substratum.
What sort of evidence would there be, that you would know, if your very faculties for evaluating evidence were at fault?
An ostensibly cognitive creature whose cognition was generally faulty would be a largely dysfunctional creature. If my cognition were generally faulty, I would not be able to maintain a job, interact with fellow humans, write articles or even sustain myself as an independent adult human. There is no evidence of such pervasive dysfunction, and my observed day-to-day functionality weighs against the hypothesis.
Whoa, hold on there. You don't know that.
Unless you’re extrapolating beyond what I said, yes, I do know that. All known cognition requires a physical substratum. If you disagree, present a known example of cognition which lacks a physical substratum.
Could you be wrong about everything you claim to know?
Is it possible -- which is to say, within the realm of possibility? I guess. But, given that I claim to know only those things that are well evidenced, it’s a vanishingly small likelihood. Probably much more unlikely than my being able to guess the precise card-by-card order into which you could shuffle a 52-card deck.
If not, tell me one thing you know for certain, and how you know it.
That I experience the sensation of consciousness. I know it because it’s manifest.
How do you know that about such a creature? We haven't established that you know anything about the outside world or that you can even sense it properly.
You don't know for sure you're interacting with other humans or holding a job. Could be the Matrix.
And of course there's no evidence. There's just as much evidence as there is for the hypothesis that you ARE properly sensing the external world.
All known cognition requires a physical substratum.
Problem is, you don't know of any.
Is it possible -- which is to say, within the realm of possibility? I guess.
So, if you could be wrong about everything you claim to know, you have given up knowledge. You don't actually know anything, do you?
That I experience the sensation of consciousness. I know it because it’s manifest.
How do you know that about such a creature? We haven't established that you know anything about the outside world or that you can even sense it properly.
Starting from a foundational first principle of evidentialism, I am very confident that I know things about the outside world and that I sense it properly. My beliefs are driven by evidence, and evidence exists that I sense the world properly.
Lived experience evidences what is necessary to maintain a job, interact with fellow humans, write articles and sustain oneself as an independent adult human. Generally faulty cognition is incompatible with what, through lived experience, I know those things to require.
You don't know for sure you're interacting with other humans or holding a job. Could be the Matrix.
I am very confident that, in my experienced reality, I interact with other humans and hold a job. If my experienced reality is an illusion—created by the Matrix or Descartes' evil demon—“actual reality” is irrelevant. My consciousness exists in my experienced reality, not some “actual reality” inaccessible to my consciousness.
And of course there's no evidence. There's just as much evidence as there is for the hypothesis that you ARE properly sensing the external world.
My observed day-to-day functionality evidences that I properly sense the external world. If I did not properly sense the external world, this day-to-day functionality would not be observed.
Problem is, you don't know of any.
Are you alleging I don't know of any physical substrata for cognition? Yes, I do.
So, if you could be wrong about everything you claim to know, you have given up knowledge. You don't actually know anything, do you?
As written earlier, I guess it's possible I could be wrong about everything I claim to know, but it is of infinitesimal likelihood because, on a foundational first principle of evidentialism, the confidence with which I hold any belief is directly proportional to the quality, quantity and conclusiveness of the evidence adduced to substantiate it. If, on evidentialism, I possess a very high degree of confidence in thousands of ostensible facts, it is—I repeat—a vanishingly small likelihood that I am wrong about everything. So, no, I have not given up knowledge…just unshakable certitude.
How do you know you're experiencing it?
The question can only be answered tautologically: I know I experience the sensation of consciousness because my conscious experience is of being conscious.
You certainly live your beliefs and evangelize them well. It's just a shame that said beliefs are false, right down the line.
ReplyDeleteIt is a shame, indeed.
ReplyDeleteOTOH, if Jesus is not Lord and Christianity is false, then it doesn't matter that Jesus isn't Lord.
Sure, nothing matters objectively, in the sense of on a cosmic, eternal scale. But, it's still a shame to devote so much of one's time to preaching a gospel whose falsity remains unknown to the earnest, sincere preacher.
ReplyDeleteThere is no good reason to believe categorical, universally binding ought to or ought not to statements exist.
There is no good reason to believe that human abortion is something that has a moral character, either good or bad.
There is no good reason to believe human beings -- fetal or full grown -- have intrinsic value.
There is no good reason to believe human beings -- fetal or full grown -- have naturally existing (non-governmental) rights.
There is no good reason to believe that any ostensibly factual statement of what's "moral" or "immoral" is anything but absurd.
Why is it a shame? B/c you say so? I don't even know you exist.
ReplyDeleteIt's not true that I ought to listen to you or care about what you say. It's also not true that I ought NOT to listen to you or care about what you say.
And it doesn't matter whether those things are true or not true. And it doesn't matter whether that last statement is true.
What's sad is that you can't see how you're selling pure, absurd despair. It's not enough that you imbibe it. You want others to share in your absurdity and despair. It's an indication that you're made in the image of God. It's part of the suppression of the truth in unrighteousness in which you engage.
Why is it a shame? B/c you say so? I don't even know you exist.
ReplyDeleteYou’re preaching Moral Teaching [X], which is predicated on the veracity of Worldview [A]. In actuality, though, Worldview [A] is not veracious, whereas no flaws have been found in Worldview [B]. On Worldview [B], Moral Teaching [X] is neither true nor false; it’s absurd. Inasmuch as you are earnestly and sincerely preaching something that is absurd but whose absurdity you don’t realize—and that you would not preach if you did realize its absurdity—it’s a shame.
Your subsequent comments were alternate phrasings of things I already wrote:
It's not true that I ought to listen to you or care about what you say. It's also not true that I ought NOT to listen to you or care about what you say.
I already wrote: There is no good reason to believe categorical, universally binding ought to or ought not to statements exist.
And it doesn't matter whether those things are true or not true. And it doesn't matter whether that last statement is true.
I already wrote: Sure, nothing matters objectively, in the sense of on a cosmic, eternal scale.
What's sad is that you can't see how you're selling pure, absurd despair.
That a worldview is despairing has nothing to do with the worldview’s veracity.
It's not enough that you imbibe it. You want others to share in your absurdity and despair.
Maybe I do and maybe I don’t. My worldview certainly can accommodate my arbitrary individual whims, even if they have no force of compulsion on me or anyone else.
It's an indication that you're made in the image of God. It's part of the suppression of the truth in unrighteousness in which you engage.
I disagree.
Meh.
ReplyDelete"I already wrote: There is no good reason to believe categorical, universally binding ought to or ought not to statements exist."
ReplyDeleteThen your statement doesn't exist.
Then your statement doesn't exist.
ReplyDeleteThere is no good reason to believe categorical, universally binding ought to or ought not to statements exist.
The above is not a statement that aspires to be a categorical, universally binding "ought to" or "ought not to" statement. So...no.
Not that it matters whether it was or not. There's no universally binding ought with respect to honesty.
ReplyDeleteThere's no good reason to believe there's a universally binding "ought" with respect to anything.
ReplyDeleteBut, these two statements are not the same:
(a) "There is a good reason to believe the Earth is 4.6 billion years old."
(b) "Everyone is categorically bound to believe (read: ought to believe) the Earth is 4.6 billion years old.
And if there's no good reason to think one ought believe (a), then why believe it?
ReplyDeleteI don't feel like it. And that's neither bad nor good. It just IS.
Kinda like if I choose to abduct and rape 5 year olds on the way home today. Not bad, not good. Just IS.
The only "ought to" and "ought not to" statements that are sustainable are those wrapped in conditionals.
ReplyDeleteFor example, "If one wishes to believe things that are truthful, then one ought to believe things that there is good reason to believe." The force of that "ought to," though, is entirely dependent upon the conditional being the case. If the conditional is not the case, then the "ought to" is emptied of power.
For another example, "If one wishes not to cause grievous, torturous harm to children, then one ought not to brutally abuse five-year-old children." The force of that "ought not to" is entirely dependent upon the conditional being the case. If the conditional is not the case, then the "ought not to" is emptied of power.
Do most atheists refuse to accept the implications of moral and existential nihilism?
Whoa there, slow down.
ReplyDeleteWhy use words like "grievous"? The only source of meaning for that word is your own opinions.
Like so:
"If one wishes not to cause something to children that Mr. Dan considers on the basis of his own entirely unsupported and unsubstantiable opinion to be grievous, torturous harm to children, then one ought not to brutally abuse five-year-old children."
You need to keep working on your consistency.
griev·ous adjective \ˈgrē-vəs\
ReplyDelete1: causing or characterized by severe pain, suffering, or sorrow (a grievous wound) (a grievous loss)
That contains no implied pejorative. It's an "is" word.
1) You weren't using it in a morally neutral sense.
ReplyDelete2) You don't even know for sure that those other beings exist, so you can't know whether they are suffering.
3) You also don't know that suffering has any meaning beyond chemical reactions in the brain.
IOW, so what?
1) You weren't using it in a morally neutral sense.
ReplyDeleteYes, I was. “Causing grievous, torturous harm to children” is constructed identically to “Baking hot, crunchy doughnuts for customers.” One can identify grievous, torturous harm without expressing disapprobation toward it.
2) You don't even know for sure that those other beings exist, so you can't know whether they are suffering.
Whether those other beings exist is an is question. My worldview is more than capable of tackling is questions. Whether they are suffering is also an is question.
3) You also don't know that suffering has any meaning beyond chemical reactions in the brain.
The only “meaning,” in the sense you use the word, that I can sustain is personal, subjective meaning, which is little more than the experienced product of brain activity.
IOW, so what?
I don’t know what you’re asking.
Let's say that I agree for the sake of argument that abducting and raping 5 yos causes grievous suffering and all that other stuff you said.
ReplyDeleteSo what? It's not true that such a thing is bad, as we've already agreed.
So what? It's not true that such a thing is bad, as we've already agreed.
ReplyDeleteYes, we agree: On my worldview, absolutely nothing has an objective moral character, either virtuous or wicked. All questions of objective, factual morality are absurd, and there are no categorical, universally binding oughts or ought nots.
What I was trying to do was explain how non-categorical, non-universally binding statements of ought and ought not can be achieved on my worldview. They can be achieved by wrapping all such statements in conditionals. Conditional ought and ought not statements are fully consonant with moral and existential nihilism.
Would you agree?
Agreement is meaningless.
ReplyDeleteHere's a conditional: If Joe wants to achieve a state of sexual pleasure, then he ought to rape six 7 year olds.
And it just so happens that Joe thinks doing so is morally obligatory.
On your worldview, his moral viewpoint has as much validity as yours: zero.
Agreement is meaningless.
ReplyDeleteHere's a conditional: If Joe wants to achieve a state of sexual pleasure, then he ought to rape six 7 year olds.
And it just so happens that Joe thinks doing so is morally obligatory.
On your worldview, his moral viewpoint has as much validity as yours: zero.
There's a whole bunch of different things being wrapped together there.
Your "If Joe wants to achieve" statement was indeed a conditional, and through that conditional an ought statement was achievable even on moral and existential nihilism (albeit not a categorical, universally binding one). But, when you added, "And it just so happens that Joe thinks doing so is morally obligatory, that crossed into new terrain. On moral and existential nihilism, Joe thinking that anything is morally obligatory (or morally forbidden) is irredeemably absurd.
So, when you say, On your worldview, his moral viewpoint has as much validity as yours: zero, that's not quite true. His conditional ought statement has as much validity as any other conditional ought statement, from me or anyone else. But his absurd belief in a moral obligation is just that: absurd. And, unless I express an absurd belief in a moral obligation, it's not quite correct to say Joe and I stand on equal footing, as regards validity of beliefs.
But his absurd belief in a moral obligation is just that: absurd
ReplyDeleteIs there something wrong with absurdity?
Surely you wouldn't assert one is obligated to avoid absurdity, would you?
So, what's the problem here? Saying non-absurd things has as much value as saying absurd things - zero.
Is there something wrong with absurdity?
ReplyDeleteFactually speaking? No.
Surely you wouldn't assert one is obligated to avoid absurdity, would you?
No.
So, what's the problem here? Saying non-absurd things has as much value as saying absurd things - zero.
Misses the point. In the sense in which you're using the word "value," a rancid steak has as much "value" as the finest steak in the country. That doesn't mean they are the same, or interchangeable in all contexts.
Why shouldn't I interchange them in all contexts? So what if I do?
ReplyDeleteTo interchange unlike things as though they were like things is to be irrational. It's irrational to hold unlike things as like things.
ReplyDeleteIs there a categorical, universally binding compulsion to be rational? No. But if one does declare one's adherence to rationality, then, within that declared adherence, one ought to be rational. That, thereby, forbids treating unlike things as like things.
But if one does declare one's adherence to rationality, then, within that declared adherence, one ought to be rational.
ReplyDeleteWhy ought one do so? Who says?
It's explicable syllogistically:
ReplyDeleteP1. If one wishes to be rational, one ought not to do irrational things.
P2. It's irrational to hold unlike things as like things.
C. If one wishes to be rational, one ought not to hold unlike things as like things.
Simple deductive reasoning.
I challenge P1. Who says?
ReplyDeleteAn ad hoc objection to the principle of non-contradiction?
ReplyDeleteI doubt any obligation not to self-contradict exists. Prove it exists.
ReplyDeleteIs that your understanding of the principle of non-contradiction? It is an obligation not to self-contradict?
ReplyDeleteSo what if that is my understanding of it?
ReplyDeleteIt's one thing to do something. It's quite another to be obligated to do it.
So what if that is my understanding of it?
ReplyDeleteThen you would be mistaken.
It's one thing to do something. It's quite another to be obligated to do it.
I agree.
Then you would be mistaken.
ReplyDeleteSo what if I were mistaken?
No obligation to believe truth exists, remember?
So what if I were mistaken?
ReplyDeleteNo obligation to believe truth exists, remember?
I never said an obligation to believe truth exists. Where do you feel that I implied one?
I'm perfectly satisfied to say your understanding of the principle of non-contradiction is mistaken (at least as conveyed through your initial ad hoc objection).
I was just reminding you that no such obligation exists, b/c it seemed like you were implying such.
ReplyDeleteHere's what I mean. You said:
Then you would be mistaken.
Why didn't you respond this way?
Then ice cream tastes like Tuesday.
The latter would carry just as much value and meaning as the former - none.
I was just reminding you that no such obligation exists, b/c it seemed like you were implying such.
ReplyDeleteNone does, and I was not.
Here's what I mean. You said:
Then you would be mistaken.
Why didn't you respond this way?
Then ice cream tastes like Tuesday.
The latter would carry just as much value and meaning as the former - none.
You are mistaken. It is a perfectly coherent, intelligible, apprehensible utterance to say that one’s assertion is not consonant with truth. By contrast, “Then ice cream tastes like Tuesday,” is not coherent, intelligible or apprehensible.
The intelligibility of an utterance like, “Then you would be mistaken,” is not predicated upon an obligation not to be mistaken.
How do you know it's coherent?
ReplyDeleteHow do you know it's intelligible?
What is truth, exactly?
How do you know it's coherent?
ReplyDeleteBecause I apprehended it, and apprehension requires coherence.
How do you know it's intelligible?
Because I apprehended it, and apprehension requires intelligibility.
What is truth, exactly?
A veridical description of what is (or was, as the case were).
You *think* you apprehended it. What you actually apprehended was your brain's interpretation of the sensations communicated to it by the nerves that brought the sensations your eyes communicated through them.
ReplyDeleteHow do you know there wasn't a screw-up along the way?
How do you know those things are required?
How do you know what is veridical?
You *think* you apprehended it. What you actually apprehended was your brain's interpretation of the sensations communicated to it by the nerves that brought the sensations your eyes communicated through them.
ReplyDeleteYou’re mixing up your words, methinks. You didn’t describe what I apprehended but, rather, how I apprehended. What I apprehended was this: “Then you would be mistaken.”
How do you know there wasn't a screw-up along the way?
There is no evidence my cognition is generally faulty. There is evidence my cognition is generally reliable.
How do you know those things are required?
I don’t. However, all known cognition requires a physical substratum.
How do you know what is veridical?
By adducing evidence.
You didn’t describe what I apprehended but, rather, how I apprehended. What I apprehended was this: “Then you would be mistaken.”
ReplyDeleteNope. Now YOU'RE mistaken. I described both.
There is no evidence my cognition is generally faulty
What sort of evidence would there be, that you would know, if your very faculties for evaluating evidence were at fault?
I don’t. However, all known cognition requires a physical substratum.
Whoa, hold on there. You don't know that.
Could you be wrong about everything you claim to know?
If not, tell me one thing you know for certain, and how you know it.
What sort of evidence would there be, that you would know, if your very faculties for evaluating evidence were at fault?
ReplyDeleteAn ostensibly cognitive creature whose cognition was generally faulty would be a largely dysfunctional creature. If my cognition were generally faulty, I would not be able to maintain a job, interact with fellow humans, write articles or even sustain myself as an independent adult human. There is no evidence of such pervasive dysfunction, and my observed day-to-day functionality weighs against the hypothesis.
Whoa, hold on there. You don't know that.
Unless you’re extrapolating beyond what I said, yes, I do know that. All known cognition requires a physical substratum. If you disagree, present a known example of cognition which lacks a physical substratum.
Could you be wrong about everything you claim to know?
Is it possible -- which is to say, within the realm of possibility? I guess. But, given that I claim to know only those things that are well evidenced, it’s a vanishingly small likelihood. Probably much more unlikely than my being able to guess the precise card-by-card order into which you could shuffle a 52-card deck.
If not, tell me one thing you know for certain, and how you know it.
That I experience the sensation of consciousness. I know it because it’s manifest.
How do you know that about such a creature? We haven't established that you know anything about the outside world or that you can even sense it properly.
ReplyDeleteYou don't know for sure you're interacting with other humans or holding a job. Could be the Matrix.
And of course there's no evidence. There's just as much evidence as there is for the hypothesis that you ARE properly sensing the external world.
All known cognition requires a physical substratum.
Problem is, you don't know of any.
Is it possible -- which is to say, within the realm of possibility? I guess.
So, if you could be wrong about everything you claim to know, you have given up knowledge. You don't actually know anything, do you?
That I experience the sensation of consciousness. I know it because it’s manifest.
How do you know you're experiencing it?
How do you know that about such a creature? We haven't established that you know anything about the outside world or that you can even sense it properly.
ReplyDeleteStarting from a foundational first principle of evidentialism, I am very confident that I know things about the outside world and that I sense it properly. My beliefs are driven by evidence, and evidence exists that I sense the world properly.
Lived experience evidences what is necessary to maintain a job, interact with fellow humans, write articles and sustain oneself as an independent adult human. Generally faulty cognition is incompatible with what, through lived experience, I know those things to require.
You don't know for sure you're interacting with other humans or holding a job. Could be the Matrix.
I am very confident that, in my experienced reality, I interact with other humans and hold a job. If my experienced reality is an illusion—created by the Matrix or Descartes' evil demon—“actual reality” is irrelevant. My consciousness exists in my experienced reality, not some “actual reality” inaccessible to my consciousness.
And of course there's no evidence. There's just as much evidence as there is for the hypothesis that you ARE properly sensing the external world.
My observed day-to-day functionality evidences that I properly sense the external world. If I did not properly sense the external world, this day-to-day functionality would not be observed.
Problem is, you don't know of any.
Are you alleging I don't know of any physical substrata for cognition? Yes, I do.
So, if you could be wrong about everything you claim to know, you have given up knowledge. You don't actually know anything, do you?
As written earlier, I guess it's possible I could be wrong about everything I claim to know, but it is of infinitesimal likelihood because, on a foundational first principle of evidentialism, the confidence with which I hold any belief is directly proportional to the quality, quantity and conclusiveness of the evidence adduced to substantiate it. If, on evidentialism, I possess a very high degree of confidence in thousands of ostensible facts, it is—I repeat—a vanishingly small likelihood that I am wrong about everything. So, no, I have not given up knowledge…just unshakable certitude.
How do you know you're experiencing it?
The question can only be answered tautologically: I know I experience the sensation of consciousness because my conscious experience is of being conscious.