Continuing with Monk Patrick:
From the essay:
Also, the reason used to deny icons would also mean the denial of the Incarnation. How so? The iconoclasts assume that it is the nature that is portrayed in the icon and that the icon can only represent Christ if both His natures are somehow represented on the icon because he has two natures
Since I deny neither the Incarnation, nor the Hypostatic Union, nor the permissibility to make an image of Jesus in His Incarnation (whereas it IS impermissible to bow down to it and give it religious piety), hopefully you'll commendably break ranks with your other EO brethren and no longer use the idiotic claim that I somehow deny the Incarnation b/c I reject icons. To do so would be the only honest thing to do, since the arguments I'm using are not cited at this point (or actually, anywhere) in the essay.
Interestingly, that's exactly what Perry Robinson is doing when he asks whether Thomas' worship of Jesus was "passed on to the divine person". One hopes (probably in vain) that you'll correct him on that.
However, Christ and His icon receive the same veneration because they have the same hypostasis even though there is a difference in essence
Here the author jumps to this conclusion w/o the necessary adjoining argument. Where's the argument that ANY image is due veneration?
This would support then the position of St Theodore that prototypes have an image and the necessity that that image is displayed.
Now you're getting into Platonic realms. Let me also recommend an essay to you.
Thus, Christ is present in His icon not in essence but in His energies.
Asserted but not argued-for.
the main cause of Protestant iconoclasm may be explained with the association of revelation of the Word with Scripture and hence the impossibility of using images.
No, the main cause is b/c Scripture tells us not to use them in worshipful piety. So we don't. Simple as that.
All in all, an essay that misses the point. Thanks for the link though.
Attributing evidence to demons in not a sufficient reason, unless you can prove demonic activity on grounds other than the miracle does not support your choice of doctrine.
1) Please provide an argument why it is not sufficient reason.
2) Demonic activity is identified in the Scr in many ways, not least of which is provoking ppl to sinful and idolatrous activities in collusion with groups that deny the Gospel. Um, yeah, that would be EOC.
3) Category error - you pejoratively describe as "your choice of doctrine" what Scripture actually teaches. This shows no recognition of the fact the Scripture means things, since words mean things. If I identify and submit to what Scr teaches, that's hardly "my choice".
I provided the evidence of miracles and you attributed them to demons
I was granting you the miraculous for the sake of argument and asking you to prove that they came from God, not from demons. Your response so far is indignity, but that's not my problem.
If you wish to attribute these fruits to demons fell free but Scripture says that a bad tree does not yield good fruit.
1) Good trees don't yield sinful activities such as worshiping pictures of dead ppl.
2) Good trees don't yield sinful activities such as ascribing to a false Gospel.
3) You've not yet made the connection you need to make between the fact of "the icon is weeping myrrh" to the prescriptive command, "You must bow down and worship it". Get on it.
Exodus 20:4. The text does not say you can make images but not bow down nor worship them. You are inconsistent.
So what's your argument against that very condemnation? I have some, but I'd like to know yours. Unless it's "I don't care about the 2nd cmdmt", which wouldn't surprise me.
You said a little lower: "Making images is not a moral issue and is not forbidden in itself because God commanded them to be created of cherubim."
Correct, I agree, thank you. Done and done.
Now, you need to move from "God commanded cherubim be made" to "God thinks it's OK to bow down to and worship pictures of dead people". Get on it.
How do you mean that no-one had dealt about that with you?
I said it b/c no one has. You keep dividing up the elements that I've numerous times identified as occurring ALL TOGETHER AT THE SAME TIME in EO dead-people worship. Don't divide it all up if you think your case is so strong.
Audible or inaudible prayer is irrelevant
Sorry, it's not irrelevant. You don't talk to other ppl INaudibly. You talk to dead people INaudibly. Thus you show that you recognise the diff between the living and the dead, even though you won't admit it now when it's convenient to obfuscate for the sake of the debate.
The fact that God calls them living means that they can communicate and not only among themselves but with us also.
Please provide the backing exegesis of the relevant Scr psgs to substantiate this.
Read Volume 14 of the Second Series of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Series.
Why would I do that? What specifically is it answering?
The scenario that you raised about Moses is irrelevant because it is before Christ's incarnation because this changes how the law works.
You who've shown no familiarity with the Epistle to the Hebrews are hardly in a position to tell me that "this changes how the law works".
Exegesis, please. Show me where the NT says it's in fact OK to worship pictures of dead people.
You keep saying that we give latreia and doulea to icons because that is what you think these words mean.
I provided plenty of exegesis here. Anyone can see what I meant.
The Holy Scriptures are a set canon of Apostolic writings which were accepted as genuine. As such it is a closed canon.
Bishop Kallistos Ware disagrees. I'm going with him rather than some anonymous blog commenter.
Further, I didn't see anywhere in your comment a specific and infallible canon of Sacred Apostolic Tradition. You claimed it exists; I'd really like to see it. Thanks!
This does not mean that other writers are not equally inspired even if we do not include their writings in the Scriptures
If other writings are equally inspired, how is that a closed canon? What is the meaning of "canon" at all if other writings are just as breathed out by God?
Do you submit to all things in the NT Scriptures both personally and corporately in your parish? Please list a few.
List a few what? I don't understand the question.
Why do you care about obeying the OT in any case? Are you under the law?
If you had any understanding of the NT presentation of one's relationship to the OT Law, you'd know that "under the law" means "under the curse of the law", ie, I am not under the curse of the law b/c I am forgiven in Christ, not by works, not by personal doing good and obeying the Law. The law condemns me (Gal 3) but Christ forgives sinners.
The OT moral law is still in effect. Did you read my post on that? Sounds like you didn't. Read it.
Are you not saved by faith alone?
Are you so foolish as not to understand that being justified is not the only goal of the human?
Do we not believe in Jesus?
You believe in a false Jesus, One Who communicated a flawed revelation, spoke where He in fact did not speak (ie, in "inspired" patristic writings), and Whose work on the Cross requires man's cooperation to become sufficient to save, etc.
Do we not confess Him as Lord?
"Depart from Me; for I never knew you."
217 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 217 of 217Rho,
He was talking about honoring persons through material symbols or icons representing them. Try not to fight a straw man, please.
Alan,
Oops, I did mean Christ not Satan.
It seems that I have forgotten to explain the assumptions that I made in writing my comment. I will try to be clearer in the future.
It seems that I am contradicting myself with the use of the word 'through' in saying that Christ is not venerable through Satan and we can venerate Christ through creation and that Satan is a part of creation. The solution to this, which I should have made clear in writing my comment, is the distinction between person and nature. When I was saying that Christ is not venerable through Satan I meant that Christ is not venerable through the person of Satan as distinct from the nature of Satan. When I am talking of creation I am speaking of the nature of creation not individual persons in nature. The use of through is intended to prevent nature being venerated as an end in itself. It may not have been the best choice of word for speaking of the person of Satan because veneration tends to end in a person not go through them.
John,
Icons are very deliberately NOT realistic
So the visual features are not important? Then how does the icon have the image of its referent if its features do not necessarily correspond to the visual features of the referent?
If you don't admit that "Jesus is God" can be both identity and predication, you refute the trinity, because the bible usually uses "God" as a form of identity rather than predication.
So I refute the Trinity? If a consequence of such import is actually the case, then perhaps you can provide us with a formal argument that demonstrates it.
I point you back to the President example, which you haven't dealt with. It's a matter of context.
What specifically about that example is relevant here? To say "The President did X" is neither a statment of identity, nor a form of essential predication. So how exactly is your example relevant?
Allow me then to reiterate a question that you haven't answered: Are you willing to accept the premise that insisting upon distinguishing between Jesus and God does not imply Nestorianism?
Monk Patrick,
Sorry, I had not read that part of your argument with enough care and you had rightly pointed out the invalidity of your logic.
Thank you for reading my post again more carefully. However, this is a not an accurate representation of my position. Those arguments are not invalid, but rather conditionally invalid, whenever the condition obtains that "Jesus is God" is not a statement of identity.
However, your argument still doesn't refute that one can say 'Jesus took' and then 'God took on humanity' or 'Jesus healed' and 'God healed'.
Are you familiar with what a statement of identity is, and what it means in the scope of logical inference? If A is identical to B (that is, "A=B"), then given an extensional context (which this is), for any predicate of the form "P(A)", one can substitute A for B, and infer P(B). This is called the principle of the Substitution of Identicals (also known as Leibniz's law and the Indiscernability of Identicals). To demonstrate how this works, suppose it is the case that "Jesus is God" is a statement of identity. My first argument translates to the following:
1. Jesus = God (Given)
2. WasTempted(Jesus) (Given)
3. WasTempted(God) (Substitution of Identicals)
However, WasTempted(God) contradicts Jas 1:13, which states that it is impossible for God to tempted. Therefore, WasTempted(God) is false (or Jas 1:13 is wrong - take your pick). Therefore, either premise (1) is false, or premise (2) is false, or both (by modus tollens). Since premise (2) is explicitly stated in Scripture, premise (1) must be false. Therefore, it is not the case that Jesus = God. Therefore, it is not the case that "Jesus is God" is a statement of identity.
You can claim that my argumentation is faulty, but for that claim to actually mean something, you need to refute my argumentation. With which point of the above argument do you find fault, and why? If there is a problem with the above argument, then a faulty inference step can be found and identified at some point.
Consider also my last argument. It translates as follows, if "Jesus is God" is a statement of identity:
1. Jesus = God (Given)
2. The Father = God (Given)
3. The Holy Spirit = God (Given)
4. Jesus = The Father (Substitution of Identicals)
5. Jesus = The Holy Spirit (Substitution of Identicals)
6. The Father = Holy Spirit (Substitution of Identicals)
Identity is commutative, so if A=B, then B=A (hence follows the other statements in my original proof). However, this makes nonsense of the Trinity, as one of the fundamental tenets thereof is that the persons are unique - that is, that ~(Jesus = The Father), ~(Jesus = The Holy Spirit), and ~(The Father = The Holy Spirit). Therefore, conclusions (4)-(6) are false. Therefore, conclusions (1)-(3) are false. Therefore, it is not the case that Jesus = God. Therefore, it is not the case that "Jesus is God" is a statement of identity.
On the other hand, if "Jesus is God" is not a statement of identity, but rather a statement of essential predication, then no absurd conclusions arise. Consider the first argument, in the case that "Jesus is God" is a form of essential predication:
1. HasDeity(Jesus) (Given)
2. WasTempted(Jesus) (Given)
3. WasTempted(God) (?)
There is no valid rule of formal inference by which one can deduce (3) from (1) and (2). Hence, the absurdities are avoided, and one can posit a consistent theology on this subject. If "Jesus is God" is a form of essential predication, then there is a need to distinguish between Jesus and God, because there are things that are predicable of Jesus (such as temptation, death, having a body, etc.) that are not predicable of God.
So, I'll state the dilemma again: One can either (A) hold that "Jesus is God" is a form of essential predication, and consistently distinguish between Jesus and God in certain contexts, or (B) hold that "Jesus is God" is a statement of identity, leading to theological absurdities, but supposedly allowing one to pejoratively classify anyone who holds to (A) as a Nestorian. You can have your Nestorian pejorative, or a consistent theology, but not both.
We can modify this into human situations e.g. 'Fred took' replaced with 'a man took' is perfectly valid. The difference being in the latter case I said "a man" rather than just "man" to specify that a particular instance or hypostasis of man did such and such.
What this asserts is the following:
Took(Fred) → (∃x)(Took(x) & HasHumanity(x))
This is only non-vacuously true if HasHumanity(Fred) is true. One could say "a man took," "a human being took," or "a person possessing humanity took." These are equivalent since a man is a human being, which is a person who possesses the essence of humanity.
With God the situation is different. I could have said that 'Jesus took' so 'a God took' but "a God" would point to one God among many.
On the contrary, there is no problem of asserting something similar of Christ:
Took(Jesus) → (∃x)(Took(x) & HasDeity(x)),
which is non-vacuously true only if HasDeity(Jesus) is true. The issue is not with the underlying logic, as you seem to think, but rather with the way the logic is expressed in English. The corresponding English sentence would not be "a God took" but "a person possessing deity took." So, your counterexample fails, because it conflates the English sentence with its underlying logical expression. In order to express the sentence "a God took" in the sense you ascribed to it, its logical expression would take the following form:
(∃x)(Took(x) & HasDeity(x) & (∃y)(HasDeity(y) & ~(y=x))),
which has nothing to do with the idea that "Jesus took", nor is it implied by it.
The logic for human instances breaks down when we apply it to God because God is Unity in Trinity.
A convincing argument for this position would be nice. Of course, this position is really self-refuting, because if the logic that is valid everywhere is invalid where God is concerned, then one cannot reason about God using that same logic. Yet, I see you using no different logic to come to this conclusion.
it is correct to say Jesus is God in identity as well as predicate, while saying the Father is God and the Holy Spirit is God in the same manner and yet this does not mean that the Son is the same person as the Father or the Holy Spirt nor the Holy Spirit is the same person as the Father.
Except that this is the logical consequence. You have not demonstrated that this is an invalid inference, if "Jesus is God" is a statement of identity.
When we speak of Jesus then we need to distinguish natures, such as Jesus dies in his humanity not in his divinity. While Jesus was talking to the Samaritan woman next to the well in His humanity, He was omnipresent in His divinity. It is the same person Jesus in both cases.
Surprisingly, I have no disagreement with this...
Jesus can still be identified to God without the logic presented causing a problem because He has two natures.
This all depends upon what you mean by "identified to God".
Again, the phrase 'have the same hypostasis' means (that is, I am now defining it again for you) to 'have the same hypostasis as the subject of its image' and it also can mean to 'have the same hypostatic image', that is the image seen in the body of Christ, as it was seen and touched by the Apostles, corresponds to that seen in the icon.
Thank you for defining your terms. For an icon to have a hypostatic image, does that mean that it portrays the same features that the hypostasis possesses? If so, then my objections still apply - how can an icon have the image of a hypostasis whose image is not the same as the image depicted in the icon (Change of Referent, Imperfect Representation)? How can it have the image of a hypostasis when it does not represent all of the visual featuers of that hypostasis (Imperfect Representation, Ambiguous Referent)? How does one even know that the image on the icon is the image of the hypostasis (Ignorance of the Referent)? On the other hand, if having the hypostatic image does not mean that it portrays the same features that the hypostasis possesses, then how can it be said to have the hypostatic image in any real sense?
Tradition begins from those who had seen Christ or Saints and then painted their image from the visual image stored in their memory. This tradition is then continued through faithfully copying icons. We know that this occurred from the earliest days because the the testimony of Eusebius.
This assumes:
1) The extant icons are descendant from the original "authentic" icons so described.
2) The copying process was without error or alteration.
3) The original "authentic" icons were accurate representations in the first place.
There is no way to prove (1). There is no way to even reasonably argue for its plausibility. That is, unless one wants to assert a corpus of icons, which can be grouped into families according to which icons they were copied from (much in the same way that manuscripts are organized in textual criticism). Assumption (2) is likewise without verifiability. Assumption (3) is unprovable, since we cannot visually compare the features of the hypostases to the features of the icons. Even if the original artists were trying to faithfully represent hypostases, there is no guarantee that they succeeded. Desire to represent something accurately does not entail success in representing something accurately.
So, once again, there is no way that anyone can know what the visual features of the referents of icons were. To say that the icon represents X, because it has his features, is circular, because X's features are not known apart from the icon of X.
We know that God and angels can communicate without a physical body or without using a physical means of communicating.
Absence of physical interaction does not mean absence of essential interaction. Spirits can interact through their spiritual natures.
We may not know how but we know it is possible, else all our prayers are also useless unless you claim that God is physically present when you pray to Him.
If by "physically present" you mean "materially present", then this is nonsensical, as God is essentially spirit, not essentially matter. God, being spirit, can be present in essence without being present materially, and thus God is omnipresent. Thus, your argument fails to refute my contention that persons interact through natures. As for "not knowing how, but knowing it is possible" - this is simply an argument from ignorance.
Why is Satan not venerable through Satan? First we venerate persons and to venerate Satan means to venerate his person, which of course would be contrary to venerating the person of Christ.
But to venerate Satan is to venerate something sustained by Christ, something that Christ has created. And as you have said earlier, we can venerate Christ through all of His creation. By denying this, you are engaging in special pleading.
When I am talking of creation I am speaking of the nature of creation not individual persons in nature.
Whence this distinction? Aren't persons just as much created as natures are?
It may not have been the best choice of word for speaking of the person of Satan because veneration tends to end in a person not go through them.
What do mean by "tends to end"? Does veneration end in a person, or not? Is it possible for veneration to not end in a person? Why, or why not?
"Then how does the icon have the image of its referent if its features do not necessarily correspond to the visual features of the referent?"
I could tell you, but then again someone studying art in junior high school could tell you also.
"To say "The President did X" is neither a statment of identity, nor a form of essential predication. So how exactly is your example relevant?"
"The President did X" is a statement in which "Predident" is used to identify who did X. Remember what you were arguing against was statements like "God took" and "Jesus took" being the same thing. Well "the President took" and "Mr Obama took" are the same thing if the context indicates we are talking about the current president.
"Are you willing to accept the premise that insisting upon distinguishing between Jesus and God does not imply Nestorianism? "
Depends on the context. I'm not the one who mentioned Nestorianism.
"1) The extant icons are descendant from the original "authentic" icons so described.
2) The copying process was without error or alteration.
3) The original "authentic" icons were accurate representations in the first place."
The same assumptions we have about the text of scripture.
"There is no way to prove (1). There is no way to even reasonably argue for its plausibility."
Well, we certainly can prove it in some cases, because we have photographs of some saints. Although I guess a radical skeptic like yourself will have some objection.
"That is, unless one wants to assert a corpus of icons, which can be grouped into families according to which icons they were copied from (much in the same way that manuscripts are organized in textual criticism)"
Well you can do that to a greater or lesser degree. Like textual criticism, the chain does not go all the way back to the autographs. But like textual criticism, commonalities among the evidence indicates a common source.
"Assumption (2) is likewise without verifiability. "
Same for scripture I guess. But that doesn't seem to bother protestants. In fact Protestants seem to cope with the fact that scripture most certainly has copyist errors that cannot be resolved, yet it is still called the word of God.
"Assumption (3) is unprovable, since we cannot visually compare the features of the hypostases to the features of the icons."
Same for scripture. We cannot go ask God to see if it accurately represents him. Its unprovable.
Vox,
Very nice logic presentation but what you claim to be consequences of this logic are not such consequences in the case of the Trinity or the consequences are not a problem because the logic of the Trinity means that arguments of identity which are contradictory in the case of humans are not so in the case of God. More below on why.
Please tell me, how many wills are there in the Trinity, and how many operations? How many wills does Jesus have and how many operations?
The logic breaks down, not because the logic has a problem but because we are beginning to apply it to a subject where the phrase it is and it is not can be applied simultaneously without contradiction. Thus, it is quite accurate to say that the Father is the Son and the Son is the Holy Spirit and also to say that the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Holy Spirit without any contradiction. Also, it is quite correct to say God is the Father, God is the Son and God is the Holy Spirit without confusing the persons. This is because of the full extent of their unity and completeness as each person from one person, the Father.
I used the word imply to mean strongly suggest and not in a manner so strict logic. This is because "a man" as opposed to "man" suggests a multitude, so saying "a God" or "a person with divinity" suggests more than one existing but, as you correctly point out, it doesn't necessitate this conclusion and more than replacing "a man" with "man" does.
Alan did have a disagreement with what you, not so surprisingly, don't have a disagreement.
An image is hypostatic if there is sufficient means within the image to identify the prototype, it does not have to be an exact image of the prototype at that moment but only such as is sufficient to identify the prototype. The use of the name with the image is the chief part of identifying the prototype, the rest of the image only needs to be consistent with this and it is not necessary that one can identify the prototype only from the rest of the image apart from the name, although this does not mean that one cannot use only the rest of the image and many prototypes are immediately identifiable from this aspect alone.
I was explaining the process of tradition that breaks the circularity accusation to the extent to show that if there is an authentic tradition then the problems of Ignorance of Referent etc are removed. This proves that your objections are not necessary problems with icons and that the Church has dealt with that potential problem with the claim to tradition. Because you cannot prove that the tradition is false then your argument of Ignorance etc cannot be used to negate icons. The onus is on you to prove the tradition false because you require this to prove your argument true, all I need to do is show that tradition is possible and this is sufficient for my case. All you demonstrate at present is your lack of belief.
Thank you for demonstrating that we can communicate in a spiritual manner. Because men are both physical and spiritual (we have a spiritual soul), there is no reason that even when the body in buried that a saint cannot receive prayers and veneration by a spiritual means, just as do the angels and God.
Distinguishing person and nature is not special pleading, because it is applied consistently in each case whether man or angel.
Christ sustains the nature of Satan, which allows the person of Satan to continue in existence, but this does not equate the created person of Satan with the person of Christ. Satan was created his own subject. Thus, we can recognise Christ in the nature of Satan and that He gave person to Satan without saying that Christ is the person of Satan. If Christ is not the person of Satan then venerating the person of Satan is not venerating the person of Christ. It seems you are still struggling with the distinction of person and nature.
Errata of latest post.
Paragraph 4 should read "of strict logic" and "conclusion any more than".
John,
The same assumptions we have about the text of scripture.
But, for the 10th time, we're both supposed to agree about Scr's reliability. Now give me an argument to accept these assumptions about icons.
because we have photographs of some saints.
How would this argument have worked before the invention of photography?
But like textual criticism, commonalities among the evidence indicates a common source.
You're suggesting that icons have trace-able tree-like expansions of copying throughout time? How could you prove that?
Monk Patrick,
Alan did have a disagreement with what you, not so surprisingly, don't have a disagreement.
That is most probably b/c Vox's IQ is ~100 points higher than mine. Please take any disagreement I have with him as a sign of my shallower understanding of that particular topic.
BTW, you'll want to read this.
I was explaining the process of tradition that breaks the circularity accusation to the extent to show that if there is an authentic tradition then the problems of Ignorance of Referent etc are removed.
And we keep asking you to demonstrate that process. Are you planning to?
Because you cannot prove that the tradition is false then your argument of Ignorance etc cannot be used to negate icons.
Normally the burden of proof is upon the proponent.
Besides, the Word of God gives us every reason NOT to bow down in religious worshipful contexts to pictures of dead people and talk to the dead. You need to give us a good reason to overthrow God's clear proscriptions.
The onus is on you to prove the tradition false because you require this to prove your argument true, all I need to do is show that tradition is possible and this is sufficient for my case.
I suppose that WOULD be sufficient for the small-minded Orthodox apparatchik drone. But it's not nearly enough for someone who's looking for the best argument.
Christ sustains the nature of Satan, which allows the person of Satan to continue in existence, but this does not equate the created person of Satan with the person of Christ. Satan was created his own subject.
But you said that Christ can be venerated thru the creation. Satan is Christ's creation. Thus Christ can be venerated thru Satan.
Keep your eye on the ball, and respond to what we ARE saying.
"But, for the 10th time, we're both supposed to agree about Scr's reliability. Now give me an argument to accept these assumptions about icons."
And for the 10th time again, you've got a consistency problem. If two people are on trial in the dock for the same crime with the same evidence, but you as judge are only willing to let one of them off, then you've got a consistency problem. Then when queried about this inconsistency you appeal to the evidence against one defendant which also applies to the other one. When challenged by a witness for the defendants about this, you just reply "hey, you agreed the 1st guy should get off, so shut up about that. Now prove the 2nd guy should get off". You'd be disbarred.
"You're suggesting that icons have trace-able tree-like expansions of copying throughout time? How could you prove that?"
The same way as for manuscripts. Experts can date them and trace similarities.
If two people are on trial in the dock for the same crime with the same evidence, but you as judge are only willing to let one of them off, then you've got a consistency problem
And we both have the same "problem", then.
But I don't think it is a problem, actually, b/c I don't seek to prove the Bible. I presuppose its truth and examine other competing worldviews (like yours) by various means to see if they could be true. If I ever found one that was internally consistent, I'd move on to other steps, but I never have found another one apart from the biblical worldview, and the EO worldview is no different. So you don't really understand your own criticism, or its utter openness to the exact same question posed back to you.
The same way as for manuscripts. Experts can date them and trace similarities
How? PLease see Vox's comments on this above as well.
So you concede your world view has a consistency problem, then you declare your world view victorious because its the only one that's consistent? Amazing.
And you want to know how to date icons? It's really the same way as you date manuscripts. Through knowledge of the styles of various periods. In fact there is probably overlap since icons often have writing on them, and manuscripts often have icons.
you concede your world view has a consistency problem
Obviously, *I* don't think it's a problem (the careful reader will note that you proposed it and I didn't concede that it was a problem but rather put "problem" in "" marks). You have a comprehension problem.
Through knowledge of the styles of various periods.
Getting back to the original challenge, the one that Monk Patrick has so far declined to meet, could you please show us three specific examples of how tradition educates you on how closely a given icon reflects the physical appearance of its referent?
Ok, so you admit I have presented a prima-facie case of inconsistency, but you are unwilling to respond to it. I see.
"could you please show us three specific examples of how tradition educates you on how closely a given icon reflects the physical appearance of its referent?"
Well, you would take a very old icon like this early 4th century one and notice that the obvious features: a balding head, deeply furrowed brow, pointy beard and thin nose and small stature and reflected in a modern day icon like this one.
Then we can note that the same features appear in geographically diverse iconography and we can draw similar conclusions to what text critics would.
Of course we can't go back earlier than the earliest icons, just like text critics can't go back further than say the earliest fragments of Matthew (3rd century), or the earliest complete manuscripts of Matthew (4th century), but you can draw conclusions about the already existing geographically diverse icons existing at that time.
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