Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Michael Shermer whiffffffs on the EAAN

I've been listening to the recent Michael Shermer and Donald Prothero debate vs. Stephen Meyer and Richard Sternberg. Not a bad debate, in my estimation, maybe one of the best that the ID vs evolution conflict has produced. Unfortunately, that's not saying much - I find public disputations of this issue are usually flaccid, fairly boring retreads of the same old garbage. One of the worst debates I've ever heard is one I attended personally, between Michael Ruse and William Dembski at the local university. Dembski finished his opener and I thought, "I cannot imagine Ruse's could be any worse." But it was.
This one, fortunately, incorporates a lot of material from Meyer's very good book Signature in the Cell as well as discussions of what seems to this layman to be fairly cutting-edge research. Meyer also pwns Shermer's blind "God-of-the-gaps" canard in real time, which was fun, especially since Shermer went on a few minutes later to spew out a steaming pile of Darwinism-of-the-gaps.

Anyway, the audience Q&A was refreshing b/c the moderator had audience members write down their questions and send them up front during the intermission, and the mod read them. This is the best way to go about things, even though the mod misread and thus fundamentally neutered the question I sent to Mitch Pacwa a couple of years ago.

I was very happy to hear that an audience member asked Michael Shermer what amounts to a variant of the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (see more simplified version here, courtesy of a friend of mine) (or listen to the lecture or see some lecture outline notes) around the 1 hr, 39 minute mark.

Moderator: Do you believe that reason is an emergent property of molecules and if so, why should we trust anything you say?

Shermer and others laugh.

Shermer: Well, first of all you shouldn't. The first principle of skepticism is be skeptical of the skeptics. Um, so obviously, but I think there's something deeper in the question on - to what extent should we trust some kind of inductive process practiced by science or reason or logic or something like that?
Well, um, as opposed to what? As I started off saying, there's only 2 explanations; there's the scientific one based on reason and logic and evidence, and then there's everything else. And the one that works the best just pragmatically is science. You want to get a spacecraft to Mars, you use astronomy, not astrology. Just b/c it works is the best answer to that question.

That's the best that this nationally-recognised author, speaker, and debater, the editor of Skeptic magazine, can muster? A string of begged questions and "um, duh" assertions? Now, I don't mean to set the standard unreasonably high here - that's all PZ Myers could come up with as well.
I'd set the over/under for the wager "number of seconds has Michael Shermer spent pondering a very challenging argument put forward by well-known and widely-published professional philosophy professor Alvin Plantinga with respect to Shermer's own worldview and indeed his very livelihood?" at 3. Pitiful performance.

228 comments:

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Rhology said...

i have a logical proof, it's called TAI - transcendental argument for the IPU. the proof is the impossibility of the contrary.

Now proceed to the proof. Anyone can SAY they have one. How does IPU acct for the existence of the universe in a way TGoTB doesn't?


But then you know I'm obviously not promoting it as an argument,

*Really*? I'm shocked.
So why should I take it seriously?


but then obviously there's not a whole lot of research required to throw out a 'God did it' answer to any question

You know, there's more involved with saying God did it than just "I don't know, so God". It's popular but stupid. Move on.

NAL said...

It's funny how methodological naturalism is unreliable for arriving at the truth except when it comes to modern medicine. Then it's easily incorporated into Christianity.

When your life is on the line the reliability of naturalism goes way up.

PChem said...

NAL,

I apologize. I did not know you are an agnostic. Do you classify yourself as a hard or soft agnostic?

If there is a god who did it, then that god would not be understandable based on our concepts, and hence, not acceptable.

To side step here, do you think it is impossible to even speak meaningfully of God?

So, methodological naturalism is acceptable when it provides explanations that can save or prolong your life, but unacceptable when it provides explanations of the origins of species or the age of the universe.

Evolution and the antiquity of the earth is perfectly fine and sound as far as naturalistic theories are concerned. In fact, I'd say they are the best naturalistic theories. The problem is when we start interrogating worldviews. Science as a whole is committed to methodological naturalism, and this simply makes it impossible to use science as an independent test for truth. It is very much tied to a naturalistic worldview in this regard. So using it to validate or invalidate a worldview is simply begging the question. Now, for a variety of reasons, I am convinced that Christianity is true. So, why should I expect a field of knowledge operating solely under naturalistic methodologies to be correct every time? Now, I do believe that God is one of order, and as such, I actually prefer to retain methodological naturalism as a default mode of performing science. However, I do not feel obligated to hold all scientific theories realistically, especially if I feel there is compelling philosophical, theological, or historical reasons. In those cases, I prefer to adopt those specific theories antirealistically. Even then, I think they may have some pragmatic value (depends on the theory), but that doesn't mean they correspond to reality.

Concerning the specifics of evolution via common descent and the age of the earth. I am convinced that there are compelling theological reasons to not hold to common descent as corresponding to reality. I might change my mind as I study further, but right now I feel the theological data is overwhelming. I am more agnostic right now about the age of the earth. I have not had time to delve into geochronology much more than simple chemical kinetics, nor am I particularly bothered by the theological ramifications enough to keep me up at night. Maybe when I have time, I will be able to flesh this out and decide if I am realist or antirealist here.

As an aside, I recently read a pretty interesting piece by WL Craig on the relationship of philosophy and science. It was interesting because he holds to an A theory of time as opposed to a B theory of time. He contends that Einstein's theory of relativity requires a B theory of time to be true. However, there is an alternative theory of relativity given by Lorentz that is compatible with an A theory of time. Both theories are empirically equivalent. He points out that this is an excellent place where philosophical issues can guide science. Now I am not sure of the details because I am not a high energy physicist. But, I found it very interesting if he is right about the theories.

Dr. F,

I still plan to get back to you (eventually).

NAL said...

PChem:

To side step here, do you think it is impossible to even speak meaningfully of God?

Of the Christian God, yes. That God, like all gods, has been too heavily anthropomorphized. This anthropomorphism is required so that followers can relate to their god, and the corresponding religion can thrive.

I'll think about the rest of your post before I respond.

NAL said...

PChem:

I am convinced that there are compelling theological reasons to not hold to common descent as corresponding to reality.

You bet there are. The implications of a Designer working via common descent are as fatal to Christianity as to naturalism.

However, Christianity has survived the heliocentric theory of the solar system. The germ theory of disease overturned the witch/demon theory and Christianity survived. Maybe it can survive common descent.

I don't see how the A theory and/or the B theory of time apply to the cause and effect problem at t=0. WLC has talked about simultaneous cause and effect (which no one here mentioned), but even that yields logical contradictions.

I can not find and have not heard a logical argument that the universe was "caused" or "created". The only logical conclusion is that the origin of the universe was not an "event" or "effect". I don't know what it is, only what it is not.

For t>0, naturalism (coupled with science, reason, and experience) offers the most accurate explanation of reality. For t=0, naturalism is of no help, and that doesn't bother me, nothing else is any help either.

PChem said...

ME: To side step here, do you think it is impossible to even speak meaningfully of God?

NAL: Of the Christian God, yes. That God, like all gods, has been too heavily anthropomorphized. This anthropomorphism is required so that followers can relate to their god, and the corresponding religion can thrive.


You do realize that you just made a meaningful statement about God don't you? That it is impossible to even speak meaningfully of God.

You bet there are. The implications of a Designer working via common descent are as fatal to Christianity as to naturalism.

I don't see how a Designer working through common descent is "fatal" to Christianity. A non-intelligent process working through common descent is fatal. I am simply not convinced that the Biblical data support common descent, regardless if it were designed.

I don't see how the A theory and/or the B theory of time apply to the cause and effect problem at t=0. WLC has talked about simultaneous cause and effect (which no one here mentioned), but even that yields logical contradictions.

What are you talking about? Is this in reference to a much earlier comment I made or the most recent one?

I can not find and have not heard a logical argument that the universe was "caused" or "created". The only logical conclusion is that the origin of the universe was not an "event" or "effect". I don't know what it is, only what it is not.

Well, the universe is clearly existing. And, every existing thing must either be necessary in itself or it must be caused by something external to itself. These seem to be mutually exclusive options to me. Do you have a third option? I think there are good reasons to believe that the universe is contigent as opposed to necessary. Please refer to my earlier posts on the Leibinizian argument for more on this.

For t>0, naturalism (coupled with science, reason, and experience) offers the most accurate explanation of reality.

I totally disagree. I think you are misunderstanding what a world view does. Yes, of course naturalism will attempt to offer an explanation of reality (coherent picture of all known facts), and so will Christianity, deism, pantheism and so on. Mere coherence is insufficient.

PChem said...

...invisible pink unicorn ...

I am going to leave this IPU stuff to Rho, except to point out that you did posit an explantion earlier (the infinite universe ours bubbled off from). I made a quick analysis of this concluded the infinite universe must have been personal to limit the potentiality of producing a finite universe. You ignored this.

you may also be committing the fallacy of composition, expecting that the whole should work like the parts

Be specific. This is far to general to even merit a rebuttal.

I'm pointing out your conclusion does not follow from the premise. My inability to tell you doesn't support what you are saying. If you think (in the absence of God) this means the universe would have to have arisen from nothing if we aren't going with the God 'explanation'), then you have to prove this not assert it.

I think you are missing the point. There are really only three options available:

(1) it came from itself
(2) it came from some external cause
(3) it came from nothing

Now, the sticking point we have is that you want to explain the origin of the universe by saying the cause was unknown, and we don't know anything about it. This is basically saying that it is best to remain agnostic since we know nothing about the cause. This isn't correct though. We do know some things about the cause of our universe by inspecting some of the qualities the cause must have to create our universe. I think that one could argue that the cause must transcend space and matter (since it created space and matter), be timeless (since it created time), unimaginally powerful (since it created our entire universe), and personal (since our universe is finite). This begins to sound a whole lot like God, and so I label it thusly. If you want to name some other transcendent, eternal, superpowerful, personal object capable of creating our cosmos, then please do so. Until then, forgive me if I don't take the IPU seriously.

basically you're committing both the argument from ignorance fallacy (ie if I can't tell you what it was, it must mean the only option is is that there was nothing) and a false dichotmoy - ie God or nothing, when there could be other options available

You either need to give a fourth option to my list of explaining the existence of the universe or own up to the challenge of naming another being capable of doing this. I reject that it came from nothing as illogical, and it certainly seems that our universe is contingent. Thus, we are down to an external cause.

I surveyed the other comments you made in the same vein of thought, and I think they all fall back onto this so I am not going to repeat myself.

As for the Wm Lane Craig refutation of Euthyphro, I'll see if i can find it.

Let me know if you don't get through.

I don't really see how simply saying God is the definition of good is any better than saying 'X is good just because it is' - it's not really saying anything.

I doubt that you really believe that good is simply arbitrary like you claimed here. Rather, I think there are some things in life that we all believe are good and we intuitively know they are good. It think the best explanation for this is that there is an objective moral law, where objective means that it applies to all people whether or not they acknowledge it. Now, we can go into a great discussion about what constitutes this moral law and how it relates to God's nature, but the fact remains that if God exists then objective moral laws exist as well. I think the crucial question is whether or not you believe that objective moral laws exist or not. Are you prepared to go the route of total moral relativism?

NAL said...

PChem:

I don't see how a Designer working through common descent is "fatal" to Christianity.

If the human race descended from beings that were almost human, where do Adam and Eve fit in? No Adam and Eve, no Fall from Grace, no Original SIn, no need for redemption through Jesus.

Original Sin seems to be a New Testament invention anyway.

bossmanham said...

And after 208 comments, the EAAN still stands unanswered. Oh well, maybe next time.

Damion said...

bossman - I don't think that anyone has ever supported the key premise of the argument, which is that if naturalistic evolution were true then it would be improbable that any species would develop very reliable psychological mechanisms for forming true beliefs. In the original argument, this is stated as P(R|E&N) << 1.

As proof of this premise, Plantinga tosses off a few idle speculations which are irrelevant to how E&N would play out in the real world, and you have done no better. Until you can estimate P(R|E&N) with something better than sheer bluster, you cannot support the crucial premise.

Hint: You have to address the likelihood of maladaptive desires conjoined with false beliefs in an adaptive way.

Damion said...

Moreover, Plantinga assumes that we naturalists have no independent means of assesing P(R) other than the doing maths on the conjunction of E&N. However, this is not so. It may well be that the evolution of many species of lemurs (L) was a contingent and improbable event, that is, P(L|E&N) << 1. Luckily, we have independent means of verifying whether lemurs did in fact evolve.

Rhology said...

Plantinga tosses off a few idle speculations which are irrelevant to how E&N would play out in the real world

Hardly irrelevant. You're just saying that b/c you've never observed that, but there's an awful lot you've never observed. Make an argument.


Luckily, we have independent means of verifying whether lemurs did in fact evolve.

Not if your cognitive faculties are not reliably aimed at producing true beliefs. You're doing the same thing as Shermer did - begging the question.

Damion said...

Make an argument.
 
It is your job to make an argument that the probability of a brain capable of reasoning well evolving once in the history of the planet is actually quite low, on the joint hypotheses of evolution and naturalism.  That is, the onus is upon you to show that P(R|E&N) is low.  Merely tossing off unrealistic hypothetical scenarios about tigers and caves is not nearly enough.  You have to make a valid argument that starts with E&N and concludes that P(R) is low.  I’ve not seen anyone do this yet, and I’ve read through Plantinga’s articles. 

Not if your cognitive faculties are not reliably aimed at producing true beliefs.  
 
They don’t need to be aimed at anything, they just need to be somewhat good at producing true beliefs.  Aiming assumes an aimer, thus begging the question at hand.
 
We find ourselves in the real world with cognitive faculties which are somewhat reliable perhaps most of the time.  We cannot be nearly certain of them, because we know of quite a few fallacies to which humans quite readily fall victim, such as calling someone an ‘idiot’ instead of addressing his arguments.  We can explain the impressive (but notably circumscribed) ability of humans to reason either by appealing to naturalistic evolution or to some sort of intelligent design.
 
On the hypothesis of naturalistic evolution, we would expect that animals would fear that which is maladaptive and desire that which is adaptive, because fear motivates avoidance behavior while desire motivated acquisitive behavior.  Animals should desire things like finding food and fear things like becoming food.  Animals should desire few things more than finding a mate and the process of mating itself, because natural selection operates entirely on the principle that whoever leaves the most offspring wins.  This explains why we find sexual climax to be among the most pleasurable experiences available, without artificially tinkering around with the biochemistry of the brain.
 
As animals develop desires (e.g. lions desire to catch antelope, antelope desire to get away) they will also develop more sophisticated neural networks to assess the facts around them which may lead to the fulfillment or frustration of such desires.  For example, antelope should become better and better at spotting a lion-shaped mass in the distance and supposing it to be a threat.  Justin Barrett calls this mental module a hyperactive
agent detection device
, or HADD for short, and most animals have them, my terriers in particular.
 
Now in humans we have a special case of runaway selection for larger and more capable brains, at the expense of easy childbirth.  We do not yet know what caused this to happen, but we are refining our understanding of the results, using experiments such as the Wason selection task, which can be used to identify cognitive biases which most everyone seems to have.  These biases can usually be related back to the facts of natural selection, such as the tendency of men to change their discounting responses in the face of a pretty face
 
Taking the all facts supporting natural selection into account and then taking into account the various lines of evidence that human cognitive biases are resultant from natural selection (such as the results of the experiments using Wason selection) we have a cumulative case that human reason is the result of naturalistic evolution, that is, P(E&N&R) is high.  If this is so, though, P(R|E&N) cannot be low.

Rhology said...

That is, the onus is upon you to show that P(R|E&N) is low.

Don't see why. My position provides for P(R|E&N) is very high, and yours seems to be low according to an argument on the table. Refute the argument.

Damion said...

Your position is that E&N (naturalistic evolution) is false, but that P(R) is high, that is, humans can proably reason to truth quite well most of the time. My poisition is that E&N is true, and P(R) is middling, because our psychological mechanisms for forming beliefs are riddled with fallacies both formal and informal.

Now, if you were to lay out the EAAN step-by-step, you'd see that it is necesaary step to show P(R|E&N) is low. I've just made the argument that is it not low, because P(R&E&N) is high, but I didn't need to do so because you have yet to lay out the EAAN in a valid and sound form.

So I'll ask again, what is the argument that reliable reasoning is unlikely to arise on the joint hypotheses of naturalism and evolution? If you are going to use the tiger/cave example, you must show that such bizarrely fortuitous combinations of maladaptive beliefs and desires are equally likely to evolve as useful combinations of adaptive desires and true beliefs.

Damion said...

I hate to resort to making the arguments on both sides, but since I’ve not seen this done herein, here goes. 

EAAN in valid deductive form:
 
Definition R: Human cognitive faculties for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable.
Definition E: Human cognitive faculties arose via the mechanisms of evolution
Definition N: Metaphysical naturalism
 
1.     P(R|E&N) is low.
2.     ∴ E&N is a defeater of R — if you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from R.
3.     If you should withhold assent from R, then you should withhold assent from anything.
4.     If you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from E&N (E&N is self-defeating).
 
∴ You should not believe E&N.
 
Now it should be clear that the entire argument flows from premise (1), which requires a separate argument to back it up. You have to either make that argument, or abandon the EAAN.

Damion said...

I've been focusing on premise (1) so far, but I should quickly point out that premise (3) is demonstrably false.
 
Imagine a possible world in which humans do exactly two kinds of reasoning (G) good reasoning which leads logically to truth and (~G) faulty reasoning via some particular fallacy (e.g. hasty induction) and suppose furthermore that humans (on average) engage in each of these kinds of thinking about half of the time.  In such a possible world, some humans are better at reasoning than others, and their rationality ratio might be much higher than 1/2.  Now, is it possible in such a world for some of the brighter people to start using their "G" style reasoning to identify the nature of the "~G" fallacy and thereafter make a conscious effort to avoid it, thus boosting their ratio even higher?  Certainly there is no logical reason why this cannot happen, and thus it is possible that some reasoning beings can come to have confidence in most of their conclusions even if initially P(R) =.5 over the run of the general population.  Such people might call themselves “natural philosophers” and start trying to systematize and impart the knowledge which they discover about the world.
 
The practical upshot of this in plainer terms is that one need not believe that humans almost always reason well in order to ever reason well.  It is not necessary that people get everything right in order to get anything right.  One need only have confidence that the particular process of observation and reasoning which results in a specific conclusion was both valid and sound.  Even if most people resorted to hasty induction most of the time, it would be possible for some people to self-consciously avoid doing so.  The fact that one should withhold assent from R does not necessarily imply that one should withhold assent from anything else, so long as one is able to reason well at times.
 
I would contend that the above narrative is far more akin to the real world than the one presented by Plantinga.  His ungrounded assumption that P(R) ~= 1 fails to explain why we humans have to create lists of common fallacies and give them Latin names.  It also fails to explain why humans have a strong tendency towards all manner of faulty magical thinking, including invoking invisible minds to explain various phenomena, such as gods of thunder and rain and harvest and fertility and health, or the spirits of ancestors gazing down upon the present, or the hauntings of departed souls, or the effective curses of sorcery and withcraft.  Almost all cultures have some or all of these false ideas, which should weigh against P(R) being too high.

Damion said...

Paranthetically, the hypothesis of P(R) ~= 1 cannot possibly make sense of why people generally suck at Wason selection tasks unless they are phrased in certain terms. The hypothesis of E&N makes perfect sense of this particular discrepancy in cognitive abilities.

PChem said...

I think the heart of the EAAN is that if naturalism and evolution are true, then beliefs are guided not by what is objectively true but what is required for survival. This necessarily means that rational thought itself (if formed as the result of an evolutionary process) is a mechanism for survival. There is no guarantee that it in and of itself will lead to true beliefs about reality, but only those that promote survival. The two may be synonomous but not necessarily so. There simply is no way to verify that the evolved thought patterns are more than merely pursuing survival. Thus, I don't see any way for a naturalist to be guaranteed that his thinking (including his thoughts about naturalism) are true representations of reality.

By the way, welcome back. You must be a glutton for this sort of thing. And to think, I thought this thread was dead! That's what I get for looking around here again.

NAL said...

Seeing that beliefs are not inheritable, they are learned with each new generation, there is nothing for evolution to work with. It doesn't matter wether beliefs are objectively true or are of benefit for survival, they are not inheritable.

The ability of the brain to process the data from the senses and form concepts that accurately represent reality is inheritable. That certainly seems likely to be of benefit in the survival of any species.

Does this guarantee correct concepts? No. That's why science, reason, and experience are helpful.

PChem said...

The ability of the brain to process the data from the senses and form concepts that accurately represent reality is inheritable.

This is my point. Thank you stating it so succinctly. Now, if the ability evolved as a survival mechanism, how do you know the "ability of the brain" has the capacity to arrive at true beliefs, especially about abstract things like the truth of naturalism?

NAL said...

Having the capacity to arrive at true beliefs and actually arriving at true beliefs are not the same thing. Just because a capacity came about for reasons of survival does not imply that it can't arrive at true beliefs.

Are true beliefs beneficial for survival? Some are many aren't. If the brain has the capacity to form true beliefs that are beneficial for survival, then it has the capacity to form true beliefs.

Rhology said...

Damion,

Given that the entire thrust of the EAAN would mean that, if true, your cognitive faculties are unreliable, you have two choices:
1) Give up naturalism for a worldview on which you COULD be reasonably assured that your cognitive faculties would be reliable, such as theism.
OR
2) Continue to beg the question as you've been doing, assuming your cognitive faculties are indeed reliable.

Doesn't it bother you to assume what you need to prove, over and over again? Even a little?

NAL said...

Rho:

Doesn't it bother you to assume what you need to prove, over and over again? Even a little?

This from a presuppositionalist?

Rhology said...

Yes, certainly. I'm not the one claiming I don't have faith, or require evidence for all my positions.

Damion said...

PChem -
…if the ability evolved as a survival mechanism, how do you know the "ability of the brain" has the capacity to arrive at true beliefs, especially about abstract things like the truth of naturalism?

I know that the brain can arrive at true beliefs the same way anyone else does. We exercise our reasoning and then test out if it works. For example, I hypothesize that if I dropped two heavy stones one of which is twice as massive, they will both accelerate at the same rate towards the ground. I base this hypothesis on previously held commitments to certain aspects of Newtonianism. Then, I set out to test my hypothesis to see if the facts line up with my reasoning. If the test comes out a certain way, I say to myself that my faith in Newton was not misplaced.

Now you may say “What makes you think that you can reason about anything at all?” I would say that we have to assume that our reasoning faculties are reliable at least some of the time to get even as far as cogito ergo sum or even "the woman standing in front of me is my Mom and she wearing blue and appears upset." Everyone has to do this, theist and non-theists alike. The only difference is that theists have to presuppose several more propositions, such as:

1) An invisible immaterial timeless eternal all-powerful transcendent Mind exists.

2) It set up the material universe so as to generate many more minds, apparently existing within the physical world.

3) These seemingly earthbound minds are generally reliable, because the transcendent mind created them to be so.

4) We know what the Mind created and why because the Mind told some humans about it.

5) We know that we have a correct and faithful copy of that message, because the Mind ensured it would be so.

6) We know which in which particular religious book(s) that message exists, because...

And so forth.

My point here is that these alleged presuppoitions have to be taught, usually in something like a Sunday School. You learn them from other people, which means you have to reason about whether to believe what people are telling you the truth, which means you have to do some inductive reasoning about whom to trust just to get these presupps off the ground in the first place. You may, of course, have a slightly different set of presuppositions, but I'd wager they are equally problematic.

Damion said...

Given that the entire thrust of the EAAN would mean that, if true, your cognitive faculties are unreliable, you have two choices [assuming that the EAAN is both valid and sound]
 
Those are interesting choices, Rho, which I intend to consider once you show that the EAAN is both valid and sound.  Once again, here it is:
 
Definition R: Human cognitive faculties for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable.
Definition E: Human cognitive faculties arose via the mechanisms of evolution Definition N: Metaphysical naturalism
 
1.     P(R|E&N) is low.
2.     ∴ E&N is a defeater of R — if you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from R.
3.     If you should withhold assent from R, then you should withhold assent from anything.
4.     If you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from E&N (E&N is self-defeating).
 
∴ You should not believe E&N.
 
Now it should be clear that the entire argument flows from premise (1), which requires a separate argument to back it up. You have to either make that argument, or abandon the EAAN altogether.
 
What is your argument for premise (1), Rho, and is it anything beyond an overextended analogy about a man and a tiger?
 

Damion said...

Given that the entire thrust of the EAAN would mean that, if true, your cognitive faculties are unreliable, you have two choices [assuming that the EAAN is both valid and sound]
 
Those are interesting choices, Rho, which I intend to consider once you show that the EAAN is both valid and sound.  Once again, here it is:
 
Definition R: Human cognitive faculties for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable.
Definition E: Human cognitive faculties arose via the mechanisms of evolution Definition N: Metaphysical naturalism
 
1.     P(R|E&N) is low.
2.     ∴ E&N is a defeater of R — if you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from R.
3.     If you should withhold assent from R, then you should withhold assent from anything.
4.     If you believe E&N, then you should withhold assent from E&N (E&N is self-defeating).
 
∴ You should not believe E&N.
 
Now it should be clear that the entire argument flows from premise (1), which requires a separate argument to back it up. You have to either make that argument, or abandon the EAAN altogether.
 
What is your argument for premise (1), Rho, and is it anything beyond an overextended analogy about a man and a tiger?
 
 
 

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